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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper focuses on the regulation of copyrights at international level by 
comparing the situation under the TRIPS agreement in Brazil and in the European Union.    
Methodology/approach/design – This article analyses standards and literature on 
regulation, as well as the role of TRIPS agreement. Attention was specially drawn to the 
market failure theory for justifying regulation, advocated by Baldwin & Cave. The TRIPS 
agreement will be analysed through Baldwin’s five criteria for good regulation . 
Findings – The TRIPS agreement substantially widened the scope of governance of 
copyrights but imposes the WTO view on the matter. Notwithstanding its flaws, the TRIPS 
agreement remains the most comprehensive international agreement on intellectual 
property. According to Baldwin’s theory, the TRIPS agreement as a regulation is a good 
regulation. Indeed, it achieves the major part of the goals it set. However, some of the 
declared goals have never come to existence and had been replaced by other goals. On the 
overall, the TRIPS agreement has the capacity to regulate international intellectual 
property. 
Originality/value – This paper analyses the TRIPS agreement as a way forward in the 
harmonization of the rules on intellectual property.   
 
Keywords: TRIPS, Brazil, EU law, direct effect, harmonisation. 
 
Introduction 
Copyright is traditionally regarded as a territorial right granted to the 
creator of the original work to exclusively use and distribute such work in a given 
country. (Correa, n.d) Copyrights are given international recognition based on the 
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interplay among the nations, in the form of treaties and conventions. However, 
negotiations at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in 1994 saw the emergence of new global intellectual property 
regime, embodied in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), which is administered by World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). (Yu, 2009, p.46) TRIPS sets the minimum standards for various forms of 
intellectual property regulation. One of the greatest features of the TRIPS 
agreement is that it obliges the Contracting States to apply similar or better 
treatments to the copyrights of nationals of other WTO Members, according to 
Article 1(3) in conjunction with Article 3(1). More than setting minimum 
standards, the TRIPS elevates copyright onto a new stage of development by 
linking it with international trade and technology. The TRIPS agreement also 
substantially widened the scope of governance of copyrights. (Yu, 2009; 
Reichman, 1996)   
The three basic features of the TRIPS agreement are; first, it covers all the 
main areas of intellectual property rights, not only patents. Second, it lays down 
not only the minimum substantive standards of protection that should be provided 
in each of these areas of intellectual property but also the procedures and remedies 
that should be available so that rights holders can enforce their rights effectively. 
Finally and more importantly, together with some 25 other legal texts, it is an 
integral part of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (and 
therefore subject to the WTO dispute settlement system). 
The TRIPS agreements are capable of creating a globalised system for 
intellectual property. As Eeckhout said: "[…]. Think only of TRIPs, with its 
potential impact on daily practice in intellectual property law". (Eeckhout, 2004, 
p.38) Indeed, the TRIPS agreement remains the most comprehensive international 
agreement on intellectual property. TRIPS is the most important multilateral 
instrument and is widely spread, as it is a compulsory requirement of World Trade 
Organization membership; any country wanting to obtain access to international 
markets opened by the WTO must enact the rather strict intellectual property laws 
required by the TRIPS agreement. (Yu, 2009; Reichman, 1996)  At the same time, 
TRIPS agreement imposes the WTO view on the matter and could conflict with 
national views. The TRIPS is sometimes viewed as a supranational code. 
(Mossinghoff, 2000, p. 593) 
This article is based on the hypothesis that TRIPS agreement can be a way 
forward in the harmonization of the rules on intellectual property. TRIPS 
agreements are making it possible to deal internationally with intellectual 
property, even though some major issues still exist. Thanks to the minimum 
standard established by the agreement, international communication is achieved 
in an easier way. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis, the article will look at 
the TRIPS agreements in general as well as their aims. Then it will move on to 
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compare the way TRIPS agreements are operated in both Brazil and the European 
Union. This comparison will be the basis for the conclusion. 
1. Theoretical background  
Various motives exist to explain the wish of a government entity to 
regulate a specific field of law. The most frequent use of regulation is the response 
to market failure. (Baldwin, 2012, p.15) Structural problems are likely to be 
efficiently and effectively resolved by regulation. (Dunne, 2015) In a world more 
and more connected, regulation is necessary as the market itself fails to produce 
the expected results. (Francis, 1993, ch. 1) Market absence is the second good 
reason for regulating a specific market. However, a global regulation is hard to 
achieve. The more countries are involved in the process, the harder it will be for 
the law enacted not to contradict or interfere with national laws. It is also 
interesting to look at the deadline the developed and developing countries had to 
put TRIPS into practice. For instance, Brazil promptly incorporated TRIPS in 
1996. However, some European countries took much more time.  
The difference in deadline between the two types of countries maintains 
a strict separation and fails to fairly resolve the problem. At the same time, such 
approach allows all countries to be in the same equal playfield after the 
incorporation period has lapsed, therefore achieving a fairer allocation of 
resources. (Black, 2002; Baldwin, 2012) An equal bargaining power is a 
precondition for efficient and fair markets, which is one of the goals of the TRIPS 
agreement. Indeed, regulation might be justified when bargaining power is 
unequal as advocated by Prosser. (Prosser, 2010, pp. 11-20) Regulatory laws are 
not limited to correcting the market and can help constituting market relations but 
more importantly to provide frameworks of rights and processes which will avoid 
market fragmentation. (Shearing, 1994) Avoiding market fragmentation is an 
important step to be taken to allow the market to work properly. Regulation is the 
primary method for the organization of social relations. (Baldwin, 2012, p.20) 
Often regulation of this type is pursuing a public interest objective. (Morgan & 
Yeung, 2007, p. ch.2; Hantke-Domas, 2003; Levine & Forrence, 1990) 
One of the principles of law we will be concerned with is the authority 
of the state to regulate private conducts. This is closely intertwined with the 
principle of public international law about jurisdiction because states can only 
exercise their regulatory power where they have jurisdiction. (Gerber, 2010) A 
unitary approach to law will not be adequate to investigate the regulatory aspect 
that the TRIPS agreements can have. By using a comparative approach, we will 
be able to demonstrate the impact the TRIPS has and whether it can be a basis for 
further harmonization. In order to ascertain whether further harmonisation is 
necessary and after having compared the two systems, namely the European 
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Union and Brazil, the TRIPS will be analysed according to Baldwin five criteria 
of good regulation. 
2. Historical background   
Nowadays, almost every member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) had reformed their intellectual property laws in order to implement the 
minimum standards of protection prescribed in the TRIPS Agreement.1 This is an 
important step forward as global intellectual property protection was once largely 
fragmented and ineffective. Until the enactment of the 1883 Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property and the 1885 Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the protection of intellectual property 
rights and patents was nearly inexistent. (Yusuf, 2008, pp. 3-21; Gervais, 2nd edn, 
2003; Emmert, 1990, p.1137; Taketa, 2002, p.958)  
The development of international intellectual property laws can be 
divided into three periods; the first period is featured by the total lack of 
international protection, the second period is highlighted by the enactment of the 
Paris and Berne Conventions, and finally, IP rights were linked to trade which 
leads to the emergence of the TRIPS Agreement. (Drahos, pp. 2-7) 
The Berne and Paris Conventions were a direct response to the lack of 
effective protection that national law provided for foreign rights, especially for 
countries having less rigid regimes in place. These agreements had the advantage 
to oblige signatories to impose basic minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection. (Mossinghoff, 2000) Indeed, the protection of copyright was restricted 
to national borders, leading to a proneness to assure trans-border enforcement of 
IP rights and to the near impossibility of trans-border coordination. (Reichman, 
1996) Due to this lack of trans-border protection, the prevention of imitation or 
copies abroad was rare unless the other countries granted in their national IP laws 
a very similar protection. Although extensively revised and amended over time, 
these landmark conventions long embodied the basic principles of international 
intellectual property law. (Emmert, 1990, p. 1337; Taketa, 2002, p. 958)  
Once globalization seriously spread, the conventions started to show 
signs of aging and the omission of IP rights in trade-related matter lead to abuse. 
Even though the treaties protected inventors and authors, it became common 
practice in underdeveloped countries to breach IP rights, which created a negative 
impact on the USA, Europe and Japan’s trade balances. The major problem of 
                                                          
1Article 1 of the TRIPS establishes the minimum standard: “Members shall give effect to 
the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in 
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within 
their own legal system and practice” 
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both conventions was that they did not contain a good enforcement system, but 
only included an optional dispute resolution mechanism as stipulated in Article 
29 of both conventions (YU, 2004, p.15) As a direct result, the USA and the 
European Union tried to convince developing countries to accept negotiation on 
a GATT’s framework on intellectual property. (Yu, 2009, p.18) Due to the USA’s 
threats of trade sanctions, IP was included on the agenda of the Ministerial 
Conference in Geneva in November 1982. During that conference, contracting 
parties agreed that a new round of negotiations would start in September 1986. 
(Evans, 1994; Emmert, 1990, p.1337) During these negotiations, the inclusion of 
IP in the GATT’s framework was discussed and finally added during the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Punta del Este in September 1986. 
(Abbott, 1989)  
All aspects of the negotiations were finally resolved on the 15 December 
1993. The "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round on 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations" was signed at Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 
1994. By signing this Final Act, countries agreed on the content of the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (also called WTO 
Agreement). The TRIPS Agreement is one of the agreements which is part of the 
umbrella of the WTO Agreement. Indeed, the Marrakesh Agreement is composed 
of four annexes. The three first annexes are integral parts of the agreement binding 
all members while the fourth is only binding on members that accepted it.  
The main achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations were the 
establishment of the WTO, the inclusion of Annex 1C, which is commonly called 
TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and 
the incorporation of dispute settlement mechanisms. (Cooper Dreyfuss & 
Lowenfeld, 1997; Weiss, 1990) The TRIPS Agreement is by far the most 
comprehensive and encompassing effort to regulate IP right at an international 
level. Opinions diverge as for instance, Jagdish Bhagwati is advocating the idea 
that IP rights should never have been included in the WTO agenda. In his opinion 
“Intellectual property protection is not a trade issue; and the WTO ought to be 
about lowering trade barriers and tackling market access problems that will often 
go beyond border measures to internal regulations: a thorny issue”. Although 
Jagdish Bhagwati has a valid point, by increasing the level of minimum standards 
for all members of the WTO, WTO is also lowering the barriers to trade. It is true 
that the minimum standard is a relatively high standard certainly for developing 
countries. However, it was the best compromise between the highest standards, 
that can be for instance found in the US or the European Union, and the lowest 
standards applicable in some developing countries. (Drahos P. )   
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3. The post-TRIPS framework   
 With globalization spreading, global counterfeit and piracy have been 
rising. This had a direct impact on trade relations causing the hindrance of 
technological transfer and innovation as well as economic tensions. The TRIPS 
was seen as the solution to ease the problem. The TRIPS Agreement encompasses 
all forms of intellectual property and aims at harmonizing and strengthening 
standards of protection and providing for effective enforcement at both national 
and international levels. (Otten, 1998; Dreier, 1996, p.249; Reichman, 1997, pp. 
340-344) 
 The major challenge that the legislator faces concerning the protection 
of intellectual property is to find a fair balance between the short-term interests in 
maximizing access and the long-term interests of promoting creativity and 
innovation. This is even truer regarding the international level. The purpose and 
expectations when increasing the level of protection are to boost the number of 
new works created leading to an economic enhancement. However, as Landes and 
Posner argue such effect will occur up to a certain point, after that point, the 
negative impact of the strengthening of the level of copyright, namely a highest 
cost of creating a new work, will dominate (Landes & Posner, 1989). 
Consequently, it is critical to strike a balance in copyright regulatory policies.  
 TRIPS agreement is not simply raising the level of protection for 
intellectual property; it tries to achieve the best possible balance, which will 
satisfy all the stakeholders. The TRIPS agreement is concerned with intellectual 
property in general but more particularly with pharmaceutical patents. (Yusuf, 
2008) The main reason is that the tension between making existing drugs as 
available as possible and at the same time there is a need to provide incentives for 
research and development of new drugs is acute. Article 7 of the TRIPS, which 
embodies the objectives of the agreement, emphasises this dichotomy. Indeed, 
Article 7 recognizes that the protection of intellectual property should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation. At the same time, the transfer and 
dissemination of technology must contribute to the mutual advantage of users and 
producers of technological knowledge. These two objectives need to be conducted 
in a manner useful to social and economic welfare, but also in the best possible 
manner taking into account the balance of rights and obligations.  
 The TRIPS agreement provides strong protection for intellectual 
property rights. For instance, Article 12 and 14 requires the copyright terms to be 
extended for at least 50 years, unless they are based on the life of the author. 
However, Brazil went way further than the 50 years requirements, Article 96 of 
the Brazilian Copyright Act, established 70 years of protection. However, it is left 
to the domestic law of each nation to determine the enforcement procedure and 
the procedures to ensure that intellectual property rights are respected both by 
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foreign right holders and by their nationals. One of the issues that will be 
discussed in this dissertation lies exactly there. There is no harmonisation of 
criminal and civil procedures at neither international nor European level. As a 
result, failures of enforcement at the national level are as widespread as the TRIPS 
agreement is, as exemplified by the China case.2  
 Even with its flaws, the TRIPS agreement remains the most 
comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property. Among other 
things, TRIPS agreement specifies enforcement procedures, which is rather 
powerful, remedies, and dispute resolution procedures. TRIPS is also a 
compulsory requirement of World Trade Organization membership; “under the 
terms of TRIPS, current and future members of WTO must adopt and enforce 
strong, non-discriminatory minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection”. (Maskus, 1998, p.109) In other words, to obtain access to 
international markets opened by the WTO, countries must adopt the rather strict 
intellectual property law found in the TRIPS agreement. 
 The TRIPS agreement is subject to other conventions in place such as the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1971, as 
stipulated in Article 9(1) of the TRIPS agreement. This is not surprising as many 
of the TRIPS provisions were modeled on the Berne Convention. (Drahos; De 
Castro, 2011) The provisions on trademark and patent were based on the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. For instance, the provisions 
on the protection of software and database are identical, Article 10 of the TRIPS 
agreement. However, these conventions and WTO rules under TRIPS have not 
been implemented uniformly in every contracting state, leading to important 
disparities.  
 One of the main reasons for these implementation problems was that 
governments were obliged to deal with concepts that they were unfamiliar with 
and rather complex copyright issues. Article 6(1)(c) of the Trade Mark Act 1994 
illustrates this problem. Indeed, Article 6(1)(c) is not reflecting exactly the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement Article 16(2). An important part of Article 
16(2), namely ‘Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in 
the relevant sector of the public’, is left out in Article 6(1)(c). The English courts 
may remedy to this problem by imposing a similar standard when looking at the 
case. However, until the courts do so, there is no certainty that the missing 
requirement of the TRIPS agreement will be applied, leaving the members of 
WTO in an uncomfortable situation. Well-known marks are falling under the tort 
of passing off, which has no equivalence in continental Europe. Additionally, the 
UK being still part of the European Union, it is bound by various European piece 
of legislations which sometimes conflict with the TRIPS agreement. 
                                                          
2DS362 - China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
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 In the US, the implementation of the TRIPS was also complicated due to 
Article 6(1)(2) of the US Constitution whereby any provisions of an international 
treaty conflicting with US law is void. Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994 
(URAA) modified existing US law to embodied the TRIPS agreement. However, 
Section 102(a) of the URAA reiterates Article 6(1)(2) of the Constitution meaning 
that domestic law prevails over international law. Prior to TRIPs, discrimination 
against foreign inventors was part of the daily routine. For instance, US law was 
awarding patents to the party who is the first to invent in the US, not considering 
the activities that occurred abroad. After the European trading partner’s 
objections, the US amended its legislation to allow foreign inventors to rely on 
activities in any WTO Member nation. (Byrne, 1995, p.131) Nevertheless, the US 
decided to keep its difference by maintaining the first to invent system rather than 
the first to file system that is in place in many countries. 
a. Declared goals v. Model adopted 
Various problems have been pinpointed in the introduction. The role 
played by the WTO in providing an effective international copyright protection 
and enforcement regime is of crucial importance to this distortion between the 
declared goals and the model adopted. Indeed, within the TRIPS system itself, 
there are contradictions between the declared goals and the model adopted. If such 
contradictions already exist within the system, it is logical that contradiction will 
be found between the TRIPS system and national laws. This is partially because 
while WTO does provide a platform for the member nations to dispute copyright 
violation by other member nations, it is yet to get the full confidence of its 
members as reflected by only ten cases that have reached WTO since 1996. Maybe 
the one-size-fits-all approach which establishes a unique standard of intellectual 
property protection is not the best solution, even though the TRIPS agreement 
also includes more flexible provisions. It can even be said that this approach solely 
favors the interests of developed states and big transnational corporations by 
making the refusal to perform as required by developed states less desirable than 
complying with such demand. (Gerhart, 2000, p.369; Reichman, 2000; Abbott, 
1989) Indeed, the agreement is mostly interpreted by developed countries and 
ignores the local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, institutional 
capacities, and public health conditions of less-developed countries. (Yu, 2007, 
p.828; Correa, 2007, p.91; UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2004, p. 118) Often the standards 
under the TRIPS agreement were implemented in developing countries while few 
of them had in place a competition law regime that would allow them to control 
and remedy abuses in the exercise of IPRs. However, that was not the case of 
Brazil, as it already had a competition law. (Correa, 2000)  
The dichotomy between declared goals and model adopted is exemplified 
by the question of direct effect.  
Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement… (p. 131-160) 139 
DEFOSSEZ, D. A. L. Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): The European Union and Brazil. Revista de Direito Setorial e 
Regulatório, Brasília, v. 3, n. 2, p. 131-160, outubro de 2017. 
4. The direct effect question 
The different interpretations of Article 1(1) of the agreement illustrate 
this divergence between desired goals and adopted model. Article 1(1) is to be 
read as followed; “Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. 
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does 
not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”  
At first glance, the first sentence suggests that the contracting states are 
under the obligation to grant direct effect to all the provisions of the TRIPS. This 
would be the most appropriate solution to make the TRIPS a real global system. 
However, the second sentence annuls the effect of the first sentence by referring 
to the implementation of the TRIPS into national law and granting the possibility 
to extend the rights further. Finally, the third sentence renders the direct effect of 
the provisions an unviable solution, as this sentence leaves room to the contracting 
states to determine the appropriate method of implementation under their legal 
system. The desired goal was to make the TRIPS directly effective, while the 
adopted model is to rely on national willingness to implement the agreement.  
This lack of clarity allowed scholars to affirm that the TRIPS agreement 
is aimed at states and therefore cannot have direct effect as it was never its purpose 
to grant rights to individuals. (Barbosa, 2003, p.49) TRIPS is only setting minimal 
patterns to be followed and not uniform rules. Therefore national law is of crucial 
importance. (Barral W. , 2000, p.72) There are no doubts about the fact that some 
provisions of the TRIPS agreement are of normative nature, as some provisions 
are “either directly based on or inspired by those of the Draft International Code 
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology which was negotiated under the 
auspices of UNCTAD but was never adopted as an international instrument”. 
(Yusuf, 2008) Article 2 of the draft was copied in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS.3 
                                                          
3“(1) Parties recognize that intellectual property rights are granted not only in 
acknowledgement of the contributions of inventors and creators, but also to assist in the 
diffusion of technological knowledge and its dissemination to those who could benefit from 
it in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and agree that this balance of 
rights and obligations inherent in all systems of intellectual property rights should be 
observed. 
(2) In formulating or amending their national laws and regulations on IPRs, Parties have 
the right to adopt appropriate measures to protect public morality, national security, public 
health and nutrition, or to promote public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socioeconomic and technological development. 
(3) Parties agree that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and enhance the international 
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The ideas convey by paragraph 1 to 3 of Article 2 are embodied in Article 7 while 
the last paragraph became part of Article 8.  
Part of the discussion on the nature of Articles 7 and 8 is based on the 
fact that Article 7 refers to ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’, leading some commentators 
to argue that the provision is encouraging contracting States to enhance the 
protection of IP rights provided by their national law. (Chon, 2006, p.2843; 
Correa, 2007, p. 93; Gorlin, 1999, p.16) Nevertheless, the place of the provision 
should be taken into consideration. As Professor Gervais said ‘[t]he fact that a 
provision of this nature is contained in the body of the agreement, and not in the 
preamble, would seem to heighten its status.' (Gervais, 2003, p.116) One certainty, 
with regard these two provisions, is that they embody norms accepted in 
developed countries, which were the very fear developing countries had during 
the negotiations. (Gervais, 2005, pp.507-508) 
Another important provision that can hardly be considered as a minimum 
standard is Article 66 which states that ‘[d]eveloped country Members shall 
provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose 
of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base’. 
This provision sounds more like an obligation rather than an invitation for 
developed countries to help less-developed countries. Similarly, Article 67 
provides that “[d]eveloped country Members shall provide, on request and on 
mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in 
favour of developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation 
shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the 
prevention of their abuse and shall include support regarding the establishment or 
reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters[…]”. In 
this respect, the regulatory power of the TRIPS agreement can be directly 
recognised. The TRIPS is forcing developed countries to help to establish a fairer 
system. The TRIPS, through this provision, is regulating the balance of powers 
and tries to incorporate as many countries as possible, creating an even playfield 
for all the participants. This in turn proves the capacity of the TRIPS agreement 
to create a globalised system regulating IP rights. This globalised system is based 
on a fairer distribution of powers and a transfer of knowledge. Close scrutiny of 
the use of Article 67 is necessary as developed countries could use their 
                                                          
transfer of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge. 
(4) Each Party will take the measures it deems appropriate with a view to preventing the 
abuse of intellectual property rights or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. Parties undertake to 
consult each other and to co-operate in this regard.” 
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obligations to help as a mean to implement regulations that are favourable for 
them and less for the less-developed country they are helping.  
The TRIPS agreement system has flaws and the lack of a centralised 
system for regulating the matter, resulting in an increase in the gap between these 
two goals. One of the major reason is also that no harmonised civil or criminal 
procedures exist, obliging WTO to rely on the good will of the contracting parties. 
Other measures do exist. However, for these measures to be effective, WTO needs 
to play more proactive role in protecting and enforcing copyrights between the 
nations. The lack of direct effect of Articles 41 to 50 on enforcement of 
intellectual property rights renders these articles weak and vulnerable to the 
goodwill of the contracting states. (Bronkers, 2008, p.255) 
Even though WTO does not enforce these rights itself, there are 
mechanisms put in place for WTO to exercise scrutiny over its contracting states. 
The WTO panels and the Council for TRIPS have an important role to play in 
safeguarding the declared goals of the TRIPS. The Council is responsible for 
monitoring the operation of the Agreement, ensuring that members comply with 
their obligations and affording opportunities for consultations between members. 
However, the contracting states are the one in charge of passing the laws and 
taking the measures. The use of the principle of consistent interpretation can be 
used as a strong mechanism in the domestic rulings of WTO, especially in 
countries that deny direct effect. 
 
5. The European Union  
The European Union had a strong influence on the shaping of various 
countries’ laws inside but also outside of the European Union.4 It was agreed that 
the Commission would conduct the negotiations during the Uruguay round on 
behalf of both the Member States and the European Community. (Hestermeyer, 
2013, p.928) However, this strong influence and the strong framework that have 
been put in place create, for the Member States of the European Union, bigger 
problems as a layer of law is added to the original picture. Most of the current 
member states were signatory of the Paris and Berne Conventions. On top of the 
existing national legislature, a layer of law was added when the European Union 
signed an agreement on TRIPS.5 The TRIPS agreement was not implemented in 
                                                          
4For instance, the Chinese Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights was strongly influenced by Regulation 1383/2003 on customs actions against goods 
suspected of infringing intellectual property rights. See: (Hong, 2009, p. 298) 
5Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf 
of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements 
reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) 
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one document but rather various parts were implemented in various legislation. 
For instance, the Trade Mark Regulation is based on the TRIPS.6  
The idea carried in the TRIPS is rather similar to one of the cornerstone 
principle of European law; the principle of mutual recognition and the prohibition 
to treat national of other members in a less favourable than their nationals. The 
Union has enacted several instruments7. The Regulation 816/2006 on compulsory 
licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for 
export to countries with public health problems aims to prevent distortion of 
competition among operators in the single market, which is in line with the TRIPS 
agreement. The Copyright Directive8 has been enacted to implement the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and to harmonise aspects of copyright law across Europe, such 
as copyright exceptions. Therefore, this Directive is also in line with the TRIPS 
agreement.  
However, the European Parliament views IPR enforcements as the 
biggest challenge for EU’s internal market. (De Gucht, 2011, pp. 1-6) Conflicts 
exist between the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of the 
old EC Treaty or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
especially Article 102 or 133. The picture is even more blurry regarding the 
provisions of the TRIPS that are outside of the scope of Community law.9 These 
unlegislated provisions of the TRIPS fall under the competences of the Member 
States and must be interpreted by the contracting parties within their own legal 
systems, as in Netherlands v. Parliament.10  
Though TRIPS does not embody specific standards for dealing with anti-
competitive practices, it allows members to adopt a legislative framework for the 
control of anti-competitive practices which may arise from the abusive and 
restrictive use of IP rights, Article 8(2) and 40(1) of the TRIPS agreement.11 The 
case Microsoft v. Commission12 perfectly exemplifies this conflict. Microsoft was 
                                                          
6Regulation 733/2002. See: Dickie J (2005), Producers and Consumers in EU E-Commerce 
Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing 
7Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs. The Panel 
was required to examine this Regulation in the case named European Communities I WTO 
document WT/DS174/R 5 March 2005. 
8Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, also known as the Information Society Directive or the InfoSoc Directive  
9Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P, Kadi et al. v. Council and Commission, [2008] 
ECR I–6351. 2 at para. 285 ‘obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot 
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty’  
10Case C–377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I–7079 
11Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement is of relevance with regard to the procedure 
applicable. See: (Dusollier, 2013, p. 24) 
12Case T–01/04, Microsoft Corp. v. EC, [2006] ECR II–1491; EC Decision of 24 Mar. 
2004, Microsoft Corp., COMP/C–3/37.792, OJ (2004) L 32/23 
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ordered by the then European Court of First Instance (CFI) to license interface 
information to its competitors on reasonable terms and to supply a fully 
functioning version of Windows Personal Computer Operating System without 
Windows Media Player. The main argument of Microsoft was that the remedies 
infringed the minimum standards of IP protection provided by the TRIPS. 
However, the CFI refused to examine the TRIPS provisions. (Subramanian, 2010)  
The lack of clear-cut hierarchy of norms and direct effect creates problems 
with regard the interpretation and application of the TRIPS provisions. (D.G. 
Trade, 2004; DG Trade. , 2006) The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) refused to give to the TRIPS a direct effect. The Court held that "the 
provisions of TRIPs are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may 
rely directly before the courts by virtue of Community law". But, the CJEU 
resisting attitude is not specifically toward the TRIPS agreement but rather in 
general concerning granting direct effect to WTO laws. The main reason for this 
reluctance is due to the lack of reciprocity, as exemplified in the judgment of the 
CJEU in Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union: Commercial 
Policy.13 In paragraph 44, the Court admitted that "the fact that the courts of one 
of the parties consider that some of the provisions of the agreement concluded by 
the Community are of direct application whereas the courts of the other party do 
not recognise such direct application is not in itself such as to constitute a lack of 
reciprocity in the implementation of the agreement (Kupferberg, paragraph 18)". 
 
a. Prior to Lisbon   
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the TRIPS agreement 
was within the mixed competence, under Article 113 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome). After the amendments 
brought by the Treaty of Nice, the TRIPS was under Article 133 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. These two articles provided that the 
common commercial policy was based on uniform principles with regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or 
subsidies.  
According to the case law, the competence of the EU over the common 
commercial policy was exclusive and included in the Community measures 
focusing on international trade.14 The reason behind this was that the common 
commercial policy had as primary goals the promoting, facilitating and regulating 
                                                          
13Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union: Commercial 
Policy, 23 November 1999, paras. 42-46. 
14Opinion 1/75 Opinion of the Court of 11 November 1975 given pursuant to Article 228 
of the EEC Treaty [1975] ECR 1355. 
144 Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement… (p. 131-160) 
 
DEFOSSEZ, D. A. L. Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement on Trade -Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): The European Union and Brazil. Revista de Direito Setorial e 
Regulatório, Brasília, v. 3, n. 2, p. 131-160, outubro de 2017. 
trade. Furthermore, infringement of the common commercial policy had a direct 
and immediate effect on trade in the goods concerned.15  
Even though the TRIPS was concluded by both the Union and the 
Member States as a mixed agreement,16 the Court in its Opinion 1/94 held that 
apart from the provisions prohibiting the release into free circulation of counterfeit 
goods, the TRIPS did not fall within the field of the common commercial policy.17 
The reason why only the provision prohibiting the release of counterfeit goods 
was accepted by the Court is that the requirements in Section 4 of Part III of the 
TRIPS corresponded with the EC provisions on the same matter. The EC 
provision on prohibition of circulation of counterfeit goods was based on Article 
113 EC and was, therefore, part of the Community competences.18 As the Court 
stated in its Opinion 1/94, the Community had exclusive competence to conclude 
international agreements dealing with enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
However, even though the Community had exclusive competences, it did not have 
competences over every aspect regulated by the TRIPS agreement. As a result, 
the TRIPS agreement was concluded as a mixed agreement. Therefore, the 
Community and the Member States shared competence.19 
The idea, which was reiterated in the Merck Genéricos case, was that the 
Member States enjoyed competence with regard to the protection of intellectual 
property rights as long as the Community had not already passed legislation.20 
The Court recognised the connection between intellectual property law and trade 
in good but found that the connection was not sufficient to allow all the provisions 
of the TRIPS to fall within the scope of Article 113 EC.21 In the Court’s opinion, 
intellectual property rights are not only related to international trade as they also 
affect internal trade.22  
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that measures that could be 
implemented to respond to the lack of protection of intellectual property rights in 
third countries could fall within the meaning of the common commercial policy. 
The Court agreed with the Commission that those measures were not related to 
harmonisation of intellectual property protection but rather they enhance the 
                                                          
15Case C-411/06 Commission v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-7585, para 71 
16Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior and Others [2000] ECR I-1344, para 33, and 
the judgment in Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos-Produtos Farmacêuticos Merck & Co 
[2007] ECR I-7001, para 33. 
17Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements 
concerning services and the protection of intellectual property—Article 228 (6) of the EC 
Treaty [1994] ECR I-5267. 
18Opinion 1/94, paragraphs 55 and 71; (Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History 
and Analysis, 2nd edn, 2003, pp. 11-31). 
19Opinion 1/94, paragraph 105.  
20Paragraph 34 of the case. 
21Opinion 1/94, paragraph 57. 
22Opinion 1/94, paragraph 57. 
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movement of such goods. This reading is problematic on at least one level; the 
primary objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to harmonise the protection of 
intellectual property, therefore one may wonder how the Court could twist the 
agreement in such a way that it arrives to establish that measures put in place to 
respond to a lack of protection of intellectual property rights are not measure to 
harmonise such a field. This shows the creative interpretation that the Court can 
sometimes come up with to justify some actions on the side of the Union. Surely 
so when the TRIPS agreement has been enacted to harmonise the protection of 
intellectual property and such competences were in fact only competences of the 
Member States. Certainly so when the case law of the Court related to Article 
113(1) EC and the other provisions focusing on the common commercial policy 
in general, never referred to intellectual property.23  
By allowing the Union to legislate on this matter, under Article 113(1) EC, 
the Court further extended the prerogative of the Union without a real legal basis. 
Neither Article 113(1) EC, that was applicable at the time of the conclusion of the 
TRIPS Agreement, nor Article 133 EC expressly refers to the commercial aspects 
of intellectual property while laying down the principles of the common 
commercial policy.  In fact, Article 133 EC refers to international agreements 
regulating commercial aspects of intellectual property. However, this specific 
paragraph, paragraph 5, only provides for the procedure for the conclusion of 
international agreement concerning commercial aspects of intellectual property in 
so far as the agreements are not falling within the scope of Article 133(1) to (4) 
EC. Furthermore, such agreements should not fall within the subject matter 
described in Article 133(1) EC as subjects that are subjects of the common 
commercial policy. Even though there is an express reference to intellectual 
property, the reference is only concerning the conclusion of the agreements. This 
paragraph certainly does not relate the commercial aspects of intellectual property 
protection but just to some procedural matters.  
 
b. Conflicts with the provision of the Lisbon Treaty  
The Lisbon Treaty had an impact on the competence of the European 
Union over the content of the TRIPS Agreement. (Riffel, 2016, pp. 289-290) In 
the Daiichi case,24 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided 
that the exclusive external competence for the common commercial policy covers 
the whole of the TRIPS Agreement. (Krajewski, 2012) The competence of the 
European Union to act externally, in particular, to conclude agreements with 
international organisations or with one or more third countries, may either be a 
                                                          
23Opinion 1/78, Opinion given pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of 
the EEC Treaty— International Agreement on Natural Rubber [1979] ECR 2871, para 45. 
24Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:520. 
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shared competence or exclusive competence. Competences must always be 
conferred on the Union, but it may be explicit or implied.  
The common commercial policy is an exclusive competence of the EU, 
meaning that the Member States no longer have competence over this area of their 
foreign policy.25 This was reiterated in the Daiichi case, the Grand Chamber of 
the CJEU decided that the TRIPS agreement falls fully within the scope of the 
common commercial policy. This means that the TRIPS falls within the exclusive 
competences of the EU. This exclusive competence is embodied in Article 207(1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which now 
includes the commercial aspects of intellectual property as part of the common 
commercial policy.26 Furthermore, Article 3(1)(e) TFEU now provides for 
exclusive competence of the Union over the common commercial policy. 
Consequently, the problem moved from one of the exercises of internal 
competences to one of the scope and meaning of ‘commercial aspects of 
international property.’  
With the broadening of the definition of the ‘commercial aspects of 
international property’, but above all, with the explicit competence of the Union 
over this matter, it soon started to be obvious that the competence over the content 
of the TRIPS agreement would switch to an exclusive competence of the Union. 
Needless to say that nothing in the content of the TRIPS agreement was altered, 
however, the position of the Union radically changed.27 This change of position 
was reaffirmed in the Daiichi case. Even though it is a patent case, the Court gave 
its opinion concerning the TRIPS agreement in general.  
In the Daiichi case, the referring court asked whether Article 27(2) and 
(3), which determines the conditions under which WTO Members are entitled to 
exclude inventions from patentability, is still within the competences of the 
Member States or not and if the provision had direct effect. The Commission 
argued that since the Lisbon Treaty, all the content of the TRIPS agreement now 
falls within its exclusive competences.28 The Member States of course disagreed 
by arguing that the majority of the provisions of the TRIPS relates only indirectly 
to international trade.29  
The Court used four distinct elements to issue his judgment. First, the 
Court clearly distinguished this case and the Merck Genéricos judgment, on the 
                                                          
25Articles 2(1) and 3(1)(e) TFEU. See: WT/TPR/S/317, European Union, 18 May 2015, p. 
26. 
26WT/TPR/S/317, European Union, 18 May 2015, p. 26. 
27The only change was to Article 31(f). See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO 
Doc WT/L/641 (8 December 2005) (Decision of 6 December 2005). Available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm> (last visited on 21 August 
2016).  
28Paragraph 43 of the judgment.  
29Paragraph 44. 
Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement… (p. 131-160) 147 
DEFOSSEZ, D. A. L. Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): The European Union and Brazil. Revista de Direito Setorial e 
Regulatório, Brasília, v. 3, n. 2, p. 131-160, outubro de 2017. 
basis that this case is based on Article 207 TFEU while the other case was based 
on Article 133 EC. The Court, in doing so, established that the previous case law 
was no longer relevant with regard to Article 207 TFEU.30 The second element 
taken into consideration by the Court was that Article 207 TFEU is only 
concerned with trade between the Union and third countries and does not regulate 
any aspect of the trade within the internal market.31 The strong point that the Court 
made, the third element, was that on the basis of earlier case law, European act 
could only fall within the common commercial policy if the purpose of the act is 
to promote, facilitate or govern trade.32 As an alternative, the European act can be 
proven to have a direct and immediate effect on international trade.33 Finally, the 
Court concluded that all the provisions of the TRIPS agreement exhibit a link with 
international trade. The Court gave two reasons as to why, in its opinion, the 
TRIPS have a specific link with international trade. First reason is that the TRIPS 
agreement, on top of being an integral part of the WTO system, is the cornerstone 
aspect on which the system is build.34 Most importantly, the Court held that “[…] 
when providing in Article 207(1) TFEU that the ‘commercial aspects of 
intellectual property’ are now fully part of the common commercial policy, the 
authors of the TFEU Treaty could not have been unaware that the terms thus used 
in that provision correspond almost literally to the very title of the TRIPs 
Agreement.”35 Furthermore, the use of the term that resembles the one used in all 
the WTO Agreement on intellectual property right shows the intention of the 
European legislator to recognise an exclusive competence broader than that 
established in the case law. 
In Paragraph 56, the Court concluded that “The existence of a specific 
link between the TRIPs Agreement and international trade justifying the 
conclusion that the agreement falls within the field of the common commercial 
policy is not rebutted by the argument of the governments which took part in the 
oral proceedings that at least the provisions of Part II of the TRIPs Agreement, 
concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights, which 
include Article 27 of the agreement, fall within the field of the internal market, by 
virtue in particular of Articles 114 TFEU and 118 TFEU.”  
                                                          
30Paragraph 48.  
31Paragraph 50. Reiterated in C-137/12 Commission v Council [2013] EU:C:2013:675, 
paragraph 56. 
32Paragraph 51 referring to Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I‑9713, paragraph 40; Case C‑347/03 
Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA [2005] ECR I‑3785, paragraph 75; and 
Case C‑411/06 Commission v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I‑7585, paragraph 71. 
33Paragraphs 51-52. Reiterated in C-137/12 Commission v Council [2013] EU:C:2013:675, 
paragraphs 57-58. 
34Apparent in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. 
35Paragraph 55. 
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The Court went a step further by stating that “The primary objective of 
the TRIPs Agreement is to strengthen and harmonise the protection of intellectual 
property on a worldwide scale (Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad and 
Others [2001] ECR I-5851, paragraph 36).”36 The Court took the view that Part II 
of the agreement regulates the liberalisation of international trade rather than 
imposing any type of harmonisation. The Court continued by stating that the 
Union can enact legislation regulating intellectual property rights for the internal 
market. However, such legislation needs to comply “with the rules concerning the 
availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights in the TRIPs Agreement, 
as those rules are still, as previously, intended to standardise certain rules on the 
subject at world level and thereby to facilitate international trade.”37 This 
judgment consolidated the position of the Commission as having exclusive 
competences and being the only entity able to determine whether the TRIPS 
provisions have direct effect or not.  
Such reasoning possesses problem with regard to Article 13 of the 
TRIPS. Article 13, about limitations and exceptions, is read as follows: “Members 
shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.” After the 
judgment of the Court, it means that the only entity able to decide on the matter 
is the Union. This in turn will create an inefficiency in the protection of copyrights 
as the Commission will have to review each authorization on a case by case basis. 
Certainly, concerning copyrights, fast decisions are necessary to avoid the author 
to be prejudiced in a way or another. The system imposed by the Court does only 
the contrary. Furthermore, the outcome of this case conflicts with the Consten and 
Grundig case38, in which the Court distinguished the granting of rights with the 
exploitation of IPR and held that the granting of IPR is part of the property law of 
the Member States and is covered by the old Article 295 EC (Article 345 TFEU). 
Property law is the only area of law that is granted, by a treaty provision, 
‘immunity’ against European interaction. (Nguyen, 2010, p. 65) However, with 
the judgment in the Daiichi case, it seems that now granting property rights could 
be part of the Union competences. 
The fourth element that the Court used as a strong argument was that the 
TRIPS agreement is an integral part of the WTO system. As much as this 
statement is veridic, as much as it does not demonstrate that the TRIPS agreement 
has a specific link with international trade. The Court failed to show that the 
substantive content of the TRIPS agreement exhibits such link. Instead, the Court 
seems to be convincing of such link only on the face that the TRIPS agreement 
                                                          
36Paragraph 58. 
37Paragraph 59. 
38Case 54/64, Consten SaRL and Grundig GmbH v Commission (1966) ECR 299. 
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forms part of the WTO system. This statement, in turn, suggests that every 
agreement which forms part of the WTO system falls directly within the common 
commercial policy of the Union. This approach is dangerous as the Court omitted 
to take into consideration the fact that the TRIPS agreement was a compromise 
between developed and developing countries, and that there are still uncertainties 
remaining due to that decision. (Taubman, 2011) 
The same holds true for Article 207 TFEU, on which the Court relied 
heavily. Article 207 TFEU is the result of the gradual broadening of the concept 
of the common commercial policy through the Court’s case law and the further 
developments occurring in the international legal framework. (De Baere & Van 
Damme, 2012, pp.320-324) However, the Court did not take the negotiation into 
account.  
Finally, the Court never refer to the possible conflict between Article 102 
TFEU and the TRIPS agreement. A conflict between the provisions of Article 102 
TFEU and the provisions of the TRIPS agreement exists, making it difficult to 
enforce the TRIPS agreement. Especially, when it is not sure which of the two 
instrument prevails.39 Though TRIPS does not embody specific standards for 
dealing with anti-competitive practices, it allows members to adopt a legislative 
framework for the control of anti-competitive practices which may arise from the 
abusive and restrictive use of IP rights, Article 8(2) and 40(1) of the TRIPS 
agreement.40 On the other hand, Article 102 TFEU clearly prohibits abuse of a 
dominant position in so far as such abuse could affect trade between the Member 
States, leading to conflicting provisions.  
The Court and the Commission have a propensity to find breaches of 
Article 102 TFEU in standardized markets. (Ullrich, 2016, p. 541) In the IMS 
Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, the main problem 
was that the copyrighted brick that was needed was de facto part of the industry, 
creating, therefore, some confusion.41 
The case Microsoft v. Commission42 perfectly exemplifies this conflict. 
Microsoft was ordered by the then European Court of First Instance (CFI) to 
license interface information to its competitors on reasonable terms and to supply 
a fully functioning version of Windows Personal Computer Operating System 
without Windows Media Player. The main argument of Microsoft was that the 
                                                          
39Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P, Kadi et al. v. Council and Commission, [2008] 
ECR I–6351. 2 at para. 285 ‘obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot 
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty’ . 
40Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement is of relevance with regard to the procedure 
applicable. See: (Dusollier, 2013, pp. 24-57). 
41Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:257. 
42Case T–01/04, Microsoft Corp. v. EC, [2006] ECR II–1491; EC Decision of 24 Mar. 
2004, Microsoft Corp., COMP/C–3/37.792, OJ (2004) L 32/23. 
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remedies infringed the minimum standards of IP protection provided by the 
TRIPS. However, the CFI refused to examine the TRIPS provisions. 
(Subramanian, 2010)  
Since the TRIPS agreement allows exceptions to and limitation on the 
exclusive rights, the remedies provided by the CFI were not inconsistent with the 
TRIPS. Without a court intervention, such outcome would not be evident. The 
TRIPS recognises the need to prevent anti-competitive abuse of IP rights, 
however, what is regarded as an abuse is very different within the European 
Union. Microsoft claimed that the remedies granted by the CFI infringed the 
minimum standards of IP protection provided by the TRIPS.  This was 
exemplified by the main argument in the Microsoft case that the compulsory 
licensing imposed by the Court was a breach of Article 13 of the TRIPS.43  
Article 13 embodies a three-fold test with each of its components 
working cumulatively.44 Microsoft practice could not fall within the meaning of 
‘certain special cases’, as it applies to every computer sold using the Microsoft 
software. Article 13 of the TRIPS is heavily based on Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, however, the WTO 
Dispute Panel refused in United States – Section 110(5) US Copyright Act to 
equate ‘special cases’ to ‘special purpose’.  Instead, the WTO Panel found that 
‘special’ connotes ‘having an individual or limited application or purpose’. Even 
though the Commission’s arguments were not strong, the CFI ruled in its favour. 
Subramanian argued that even though one of the requirements of the threefold test 
was not fulfilled, the Commission does not breach Article 13 of the TRIPS 
agreement as long as it weights the right holder’s interest against the public 
welfare. (Subramanian, 2010, p.1017) 
Since the decision in the Microsoft case, the Court made clear that the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are applicable within the European legal 
order.45 In the SCF case, the Court established that the TRIPS agreement does not 
have direct effect and therefore cannot be relied on by an individual. This places 
the TRIPS agreement in a strange position in the hierarchy of norms, as the TRIPS 
agreement does not prevail over the Treaties but is placed above secondary 
legislation. (Wessel & Blockmans, 2013, p.2; Stamatoudi & Torremans, 2014, 
p.80) 
                                                          
43Article 13 TRIPS states that the limitations on and exceptions to exclusive rights:  
(a) are to be confined to certain special cases, 
(b) should not conflict with normal exploitation of the work, and  
(c) should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. 
44WTO Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) Copyrights Act, WT/DS160/R, 15 
June 2000, at paras 6.97, 107. See (Heide, 1999). 
45Case C-135/10, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:140. 
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6. Brazil   
On the other hand, Brazil adopted a different approach to the TRIPS 
agreement. There is a misconception that Brazil never really cared about 
protecting intellectual property. Brazil was one of the first parties to the Paris and 
Bern Conventions, therefore introducing intellectual property right regulation a 
long time ago. (Schulz & Wu, 2004) As an illustration, the Paris Convention of 
1883 was incorporated through Decree 9.233/1884, while the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, was promulgated by Decree 1.263 of 
1994. At national level, Brazil was one of the first countries recognising patent 
holders’ rights and embodying these rights in a constitutional act, namely the 
Constitution of Brazil of 1824.  
The TRIPs Agreement constitutes the Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The process of 
incorporation of the TRIPS followed the ordinary procedure of treaty 
incorporation in Brazil.  The TRIPS were incorporated into Brazilian law through 
Presidential Decree No. 1.355/94, of December 1994. The instrument of 
Ratification of the Final Act was deposited in Geneva in December 1994. 
Consequently, Brazil can be said as having a long-standing tradition of respect for 
international agreements on intellectual property, sometimes incorporating 
international agreement more due to external pressure than domestic interest. 
(Barral & Pimentel, 2007, pp. 13-15) 
The protection of IP rights was raised to the level of fundamental 
individual rights and guarantees of Article 5 XXVII of the Federal Constitution 
of 1988. Article 5 XXVII stipulates that “the exclusive right of use, publication 
or reproduction of works rests upon their authors and is transmissible to their heirs 
for the time the law shall establish”. Under the next paragraph, paragraph XXVIII, 
states that “[…] b) the right to authors, interpreters and respective unions and 
associations to monitor the economic exploitation of the works which they create 
or in which they participate”. The protection of IP rights provided by the 
Constitution is already extensive. But even though IP rights obtained the status of 
fundamental rights in 1988, the Brazilian legislator decided to further protect IP 
rights. As a result of this governmental willingness, Brazil has a very modern 
intellectual property law, with Federal Statute 9.279/96, 9.456/97, 9.609/98 and 
9.610/98.   
TRIPS agreement was approved by Legislative Decree N°1.355 of 30 
December 1994. TRIPS agreement did not introduce any new IPR system in 
Brazil. That is might be the reason why the Legislative Decree N°1.355 was 
promulgated easily. The Brazilian government pushed for acceptance of the 
TRIPS agreement, arguing that this instrument could enhance Brazilian industrial 
policies on innovation. Since then, Brazilian Congress has been trying its best to 
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fully implement the compromises under the agreement by sometimes amending 
substantially previous national laws. (Ribeiro Barbosa, 2008, p. 24) The most 
significant change was made by Federal Law 9.279/96 which revoked the old 
Industrial Property Code of 1971 to bring Brazilian law in line with the TRIPS 
requirements. This amendment was executed before the end of the transitional 
periods provided in Article 65(2) and (4) of the TRIPS agreement. It can be 
concluded that in Brazil, the TRIPS agreement, thanks to the willingness of the 
Brazilian government, have had a harmonising effect. The regulatory impact of 
the TRIPS agreement at a global level is obvious within Brazilian legislation.  
Maybe Brazil was so prompt in incorporating the agreement because the 
regulatory system in place was not diametrically opposed to the system imposed 
by the TRIPS. Another reason is that TRIPS enhanced Brazilian industrial policies 
on innovation placing Brazil in a more ‘trustworthy’ position with respect to the 
rest of the world. However, the implementation of the TRIPS was not problem-
free. There were some internal fights as the INPI (Brazilian Industrial Property 
Office) was of the opinion that the TRIPS agreement was not directly incorporate 
in Brazilian law. In INPI’s opinion, the TRIPS agreement required being 
implemented to be fully applicable in the Brazilian system. Some members of the 
Federal Court of Appeal of the 2nd Region supported the same view.46 Their 
position is based on the fact that the TRIPS agreement belongs to a modality of 
international treaties, as the TRIPS only sets pragmatic rules which need to be 
implemented at national level. The TRIPS agreement can be viewed as only 
establishing minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property rights 
rather than fixing normative rules.  
The major problem with this approach is that it conflicts with some 
provisions of the TRIPS agreement itself that can be interpreted in various ways. 
The general goals of the agreement are embodied in the Preamble of the 
Agreement and basically reproduce the Uruguay Round negotiating objectives. 
The major objectives of the agreement are to reduce distortions and impediments 
to international trade, promote effective and adequate protection of IP rights and 
finally to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. (David & Halbert, 
2014) As much as the second objective, namely to promote effective and adequate 
protection of IP rights, suggests that the TRIPS only set minimum standards, as 
much as this approach is inconsistent with the first objective. No states will ever 
admit that their laws distort international trade. Furthermore, these three 
objectives need to be read in conjunction with Article 7. The major argument 
countering the fact that the TRIPS only establishes minimum standards comes 
from the wording of Article 8 which grants to the Contracting States the rights to 
                                                          
46TRF-2: 2nd Group, Civil Appeal AC 2005.51.01.507229-7, Rel. LILIANE RORIZ 
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adopt measures for public health and public interest to prevent abuses of 
intellectual property rights. However, such measures should be consistent with 
the TRIPS. This obligation seems more of a substantive norm rather than just a 
minimum standard.47 
This reluctance of Brazil to view the TRIPS agreement as implementing 
substantive norms as well is not a recent one. Already during the negotiation 
Brazil and India claimed that only WIPO had the institutional competences to 
discuss substantive issues and that such issues were outside of the scope of the 
GATT mandate. (Yusuf, 2008) However, as Jayashree Watal, rightly pointed out 
“[…] Clearly, the negotiations were aimed not only at clarifying GATT provisions 
but elaborating, “as appropriate”, new rules and disciplines”. (Watal, 2001, p. 21)  
Even though this discussion is fascinating and it led to some internal 
problems, the implementation of the TRIPS provisions in Brazil was rather done 
successfully. The relationship between the TRIPS agreement and Brazilian IP law 
is based on the general principles of conflict of laws that are on the same 
hierarchical level. (Yueh, 2009) The two principles governing the settlement of 
conflict of laws is the lex posterior derogat legis anteriorii, and lex posterior 
generalis non derogat legi priori speciali. The TRIPS always prevails over infra-
legal provisions. If the TRIPS is incompatible with mandatory law or supra-legal 
provisions, then the TRIPS provisions that are conflicting will be void. Luckily, 
in general, the TRIPS agreement are compatible and coherent with Brazilian law 
but above all, with the Brazilian Federal Constitution and constitutional practice. 
This is mainly because the TRIPS has been implemented in a way that gives full 
effectiveness of the TRIPS agreement content. As a result, any previous 
disposition contrary to its terms will be revoked.  
Brazil won a case against the US concerning retaliate of cotton. Brazil has 
opened the door for developing countries to cross-retaliate against their trading 
partners under the TRIPS Agreement and has not implemented a suspension 
scheme. Moreover, Brazil is one of the largest markets for the legal trade of 
copyrighted materials, particularly over the Internet, even though it loses a lot of 
revenue from copyrighted material through piracy. The Government tried to work 
some solutions, but no one of them was sufficient to stop the problem. In Brazil, 
the TRIPS agreement partly shaped its legislation. However, Brazil still needs to 
do some effort to comply with the terms of the TRIPS. In order to achieve a better 
compliance with Article 39 (3), a change of policy is necessary. 
                                                          
47In Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO panel agreed with the 
Canadian view and allowed for ‘certain adjustments’ while preventing ‘a renegotiation of 
the basic balance of the Agreement’. See: World Trade Organization (2000), Canada—
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Panel Report, WT/DS114/R.  
154 Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement… (p. 131-160) 
 
DEFOSSEZ, D. A. L. Global regulation of international intellectual property through Agreement on Trade -Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): The European Union and Brazil. Revista de Direito Setorial e 
Regulatório, Brasília, v. 3, n. 2, p. 131-160, outubro de 2017. 
 
7. Baldwin’s five criteria for good regulation 
By comparing the two systems, it seems that although the TRIPS 
agreement is solving an important part of the problem and tries to create an even 
playfield to enhance interaction between developed and developing countries, it 
is important to compare the regulatory framework itself to Baldwin’s five criteria.  
“ Is the action or regime supported by legislative authority? 
_ Is there an appropriate scheme of accountability? 
_ Are procedures fair, accessible, and open? 
_ Is the regulator acting with sufficient expertise? 
_ Is the action or regime efficient?” (Baldwin, 2012, p. 27) 
With regard to the first question, the TRIPS agreement is supported by 
legislative authority. However, it is not sure the TRIPS agreement had popular 
support. Certainly, Brazil had a predominant role in pushing the agreement 
forward. The second criterion is accountability. Even though the TRIPS 
agreement does not provide for enforcement procedure, some mechanisms have 
been created to keep national government accountable for their failure to fulfil 
their obligations. The TRIPS agreement establishes a fair, accessible and open 
procedure as exemplified by the implementation periods. The room of manoeuvre 
left to the states allows for flexibility and a higher level of participation. WTO has 
sufficient expertise to legislate on the matter. Finally, the efficiency of the regime 
can be ameliorated but is already a huge step forward in contrast to the previous 
regime. Under these criteria, the TRIPS agreement is a good regulatory 
framework. However, perfection does not exist and there is still a need for further 
harmonisation. 
Conclusion 
We are living in a post-TRIPS era in which every member of WTO is 
required to reform their intellectual property laws in order to meet the minimum 
standards of protection prescribed in Article 1 of the TRIPS agreement. The 
TRIPS provisions are embodied in the majority of the world. Notwithstanding its 
flaws, the TRIPS agreement remains the most comprehensive international 
agreement on intellectual property.  
The TRIPS agreement has the potential to be used as a regulatory system 
in the global economy. It could lead to a better harmonisation. However, the main 
weaknesses of all the WIPO agreements are the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
as well as the fact that membership of the conventions is not compulsory. 
(Emmert, International Trade Law, 2012) There is no legal obligation on the 
members to grant direct applicability to WTO provisions and no impediment to 
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do so. Such legal obligation will enhance the efficiency of the system. Even 
though many WTO provisions are sufficiently clear and precise to be eligible to 
be directly effective, the matter is left to the discretion of the contracting state. 
For instance, Article 12 clearly set down the minimum periods for the expiration 
of intellectual property rights and can easily regard as having self-executing 
nature. 
According to Baldwin’s theory, the TRIPS agreement as a regulation is a 
good regulation. Indeed, it achieves the major part of the goals it set. However, 
some of the declared goals have never come to existence and have been replaced 
by other goals. On the overall, the TRIPS agreement has the capacity to regulate 
international intellectual property. 
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